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INTRODUCTION
Over the past few years, numerous securities
exchanges have altered their ownership
structures by transforming themselves from
mutualised, member-owned companies into for-
profit, shareholder-owned companies. Within
Europe, the adoption of the euro, legal and
regulatory changes adopted pursuant to the
European Commission’s Financial Services
Action Plan, and the resulting market
integration have also caused alliances and
mergers among exchanges and other institutions
involved in the post-trade processing of
securities transactions to flourish. These recent
trends in market integration and consolidation
have facilitated an increase in cross-border
trading and have brought significant increases
in market efficiency: markets are more liquid
and provide a wider range of products at lower
costs than in the past. The growth in
“collateralised transactions” (including repos
and securities lending), many of which involve
counterparties located in different jurisdictions,
has also fuelled growth in cross-border
transactions.
Yet, market integration and consolidation create
conditions in which financial turmoil can spread
with greater speed and virulence. An integrated
and consolidated market structure increases the
importance of the integrity of clearing and
settlement systems because these systems tie
markets and participants together. This
necessitates, among other things, that clearing
and settlement processes be robust and
efficient. Increasing the efficiency of clearing
and settlement systems allows market
participants to optimise the use of liquidity and
reduces the risk of market disruption and
systemic risk.
As part of this ongoing reorganisation,
securities clearing and settlement systems, i.e.
central securities depositories (CSDs)1 and
central counterparty clearing houses (CCPs),2
are increasingly being incorporated into
company groups, either on a vertical basis with
an exchange or on a horizontal basis with other
CSDs and CCPs. This process of
“demutualisation” and consolidation has
prompted a significant volume of work on the
governance of the new for-profit exchanges and
on the mechanisms by which a for-profit
exchange should fulfil its self-regulatory
functions.3 However, little work has been done
on the governance of CSDs and CCPs.4 The
governance structure of a clearing and
settlement system should address not only the
needs and interests of the different stakeholders
in the system, but also the national,
transnational and Community interests in the
operation of the system and the public interest5
in the minimisation of systemic risk. It should
also ensure that the ongoing reorganisation of
the financial infrastructure does not increase the
overall risk in the financial system as a whole.
Governance provides one means by which the
objectives of the system may be pre-specified,
its performance monitored, and the effects of
potential conflicts of interest between
stakeholders minimised.6 Hence, proper
1 In this paper, a CSD is an institution that holds securities, thus
enabling securities transactions to be processed by means of
book entries. Physical securities may be immobilised by the
depository or securities may be dematerialised (so that they exist
only as electronic records). Unless otherwise noted, references
in this paper to CSDs include the international central securities
depositories, Euroclear and Clearstream.
2 In this paper, a CCP is an entity that interposes itself between the
counterparties to contracts traded in one or more financial
markets, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to
every buyer.
3 IOSCO Technical Committee, “Issues Paper on Exchange
Demutualization” (June 2001); R. Lee, “The Future of Securities
Exchanges” (February 2002); B. Steil, “Changes in the
Ownership and Governance of Securities Exchanges: Causes and
Consequences” (2002); and M. Blume, “The Structure of the US
Equity Markets” (March 2002).
4 In this paper, the term “corporate governance” is used to refer to
the internal corporate structures and mechanisms by which
decisions are taken in relation to the operation of a clearing or
settlement system. The term “governance” is used to refer to all
internal and external structures, mechanisms, regulations, norms
and practices which bear on corporate decision-making within
clearing and settlement system operators.
5 CSDs and CCPs are imbued with a public interest because their
operations support (i) access by economic actors to capital and
(ii) risk management within the financial system, and are
therefore fundamental to the functioning of the real economy
and to the achievement of broader societal policies and goals.
6 In this paper, the term “conflict of interest” refers generally to
situations where there is an incompatibility between the concerns
or aims of different persons or groups of persons. It also may
refer, in a particular case, to a situation where a person has
interests that are incompatible (or not totally aligned) with the
interests of other persons, yet that person is called upon to make
decisions in an official capacity that relate to those incompatible
interests.5
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 INTRODUCTION
governance should create a framework and
provide the incentives for the board(s) of
directors and management to pursue objectives
that are in the interests of the system, customers
and the public and should facilitate the effective
monitoring of their performance.
Against this background, two issues are
considered in this paper.
The first relates to conflicts of interest typically
arising in the securities settlement
infrastructure and the mechanisms for their
resolution. The governance arrangements for a
clearing or settlement system must address not
only the conflicts of interest that are common to
the corporate governance of all corporate
entities, but also the public interest and the
corresponding interests of regulatory
authorities. In the context of the ongoing
reorganisation of the clearing and settlement
infrastructure within Europe, governance
arrangements must also address a number of
conflicts of interest unique to operators of
clearing and settlement systems. First,
especially with reference to CCPs and CSDs
offering banking services in addition to core
settlement services, it is important that
corporate governance mechanisms contribute to
full independence of decisions concerning risk
management. In particular, corporate
governance mechanisms can contribute to a
clear separation of risk management decisions
from other day-to-day decisions relating to the
business of the system operator. Second, the
vertical and horizontal integration among
trading, clearing and settlement systems into a
single entity or financial group calls for an
investigation into potential conflicts of interest
between the different entities within the
financial group and mechanisms for their
resolution. Third, the horizontal integration at
the level of exchanges, central counterparties
and central securities depositories, by
increasing the number of markets served by
each integrated settlement system, introduces or
increases the need also to take into account the
interests of non-resident customers  and
shareholders. Lastly, the emergence of
business models that consolidate activities
across competitive markets creates the need to
investigate whether and to what extent
governance mechanisms can contribute to
preventing or mitigating the potential for the
abuse of monopoly positions in the provision of
some services.
The second set of issues relates to the actions
that authorities can take to ensure that adequate
corporate governance mechanisms are adopted
by securities clearing and/or settlement
systems. The interest of payment and settlement
system regulators and overseers internationally
in issues concerning governance is relatively
recent. The first international “oversight”
standard on governance was only formulated in
2001 in the Core Principles for Systemically
Important Payment Systems of the Committee
on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS)
relating to institutions active in the operation of
large-value payment systems. This standard
was followed up by the adoption of an
international standard on governance for
securities settlement systems (SSSs) by CPSS-
IOSCO. In particular, the recommendation on
governance for SSSs calls for governance
arrangements for central securities depositories
and central counterparties to fulfil public
interest requirements and to promote the
objectives of owners and users. The European
System of Central Banks (ESCB) and the
Committee of European Securities Regulators
(CESR) are currently considering how to adapt
this recommendation in the European context.7
CPSS-IOSCO also is now finalizing new, more
specific Recommendations for central
counterparties that also address governance
arrangements for CCPs. The importance of
appropriate SSS corporate governance
arrangements for innovation and competition
has also been stressed in the first Giovannini
Report, a report of a group of experts appointed
by the European Commission to address issues
concerning securities transfers, and in a report
7 See “ESCB-CESR Standards for Securities Clearing and
Settlement Systems in the European Union: consultative report”
(http://www.ecb.int/pub/cons/cesr2003/ecbcesr_report.pdf).6
ECB
Occasional Paper No. 21
October 2004
of the European Parliament. Furthermore, the
Group of Thirty (G30), a private sector body,
has also developed recommendations on SSS
governance and regulation. Lastly, the recent
Communication from the Commission to the
Council and the European Parliament on
Clearing and Settlement in the European Union
dated 28 April 2004 (COM (2004) 312 final)
envisages the adoption of a framework
Directive addressing inter alia appropriate
governance arrangements for securities
settlement systems and central counterparties.
The Commission also takes the view that
governance arrangements applicable to
intermediaries should be consistent with those
envisaged for securities clearing and settlement
systems. An overview of these various
initiatives is provided in Annex I. All of the
international standards adopted to date reflect
the fact that corporate governance mechanisms
for securities settlement systems must be
complemented by adequate transparency,
requirements for effective governance
irrespective of the ownership structure
(whether mutual or demutualised), appropriate
oversight, and regulation.  Standards and
reports regarding the governance of European
securities clearing and settlement systems also
generally address competition concerns and the
need for greater efficiency in securities clearing
and settlement within Europe. The reports also
note that the increased consolidation and cross-
border operation of securities settlement
systems may require greater cooperation and
practical protocols among relevant authorities.
The usual mechanisms by which authorities
intervene to address governance issues range
from disclosure requirements to specific and
direct regulatory requirements. Disclosure or
transparency of corporate governance
arrangements is already a requirement in almost
all the recommendations on governance or
transparency that the authorities (IOSCO,
CPSS-IOSCO, CESR, ESCB-CESR) have
formulated to date. It is important to highlight in
this context that the existence of increasingly
complex mechanisms for corporate governance
may require the disclosure of more precise and
detailed information than that provided today.
As far as regulation (e.g. binding standard-
setting) on governance is concerned, the policy
question for European authorities is whether a
specific model of corporate governance should
be prescribed or whether general requirements
should be set that could then be incorporated or
reflected in the various existing governance
models. In this respect, it seems that there is no
single model of corporate governance that, by
definition or a priori, is the most appropriate
for European securities clearing and settlement
systems, as authorities are not usually disposed
to impose specific structures on commercial
enterprises. Several combinations of corporate
governance mechanisms and regulatory
requirements may provide an effective system
of governance. In this respect, an approach that
sets out requirements to be reflected within the
model of corporate governance as instituted in a
jurisdiction (i.e. essentially, clear
representation of the interests of the various
stakeholders, clear mechanisms for resolution
of conflicts and adequate risk management
controls) seems to be preferable. While this
conclusion is embodied in IOSCO, CPSS-
IOSCO and ESCB-CESR recommendations on
governance and in the conclusions of the
Giovannini Reports, it is not completely in line
with the preference for non-profit, public
utility-oriented models expressed in the
European Parliament Report on Clearing and
Settlement (see Annex I).
This paper is organised as follows: Section 1
provides a description of the existing general
approaches to corporate governance. Section 2
identifies determinants of the corporate
governance structures and mechanisms of
securities clearing and settlement systems.
Section  3 addresses potential conflicts of
interest among providers of clearing and
settlement services and the governance
mechanisms instituted to address them. Section
4 provides an overview of authorities’ concerns
and other general public policy responses
relating to the governance of securities clearing
and settlement systems. It discusses the
necessity to complete the internal market within7
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 INTRODUCTION
the Community with regard to securities
clearing and settlement systems and an
approach to harmonise the mechanisms
governing those systems to further achieve that
goal.8
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1 GENERAL APPROACHES TO CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
In general, in stock corporations, the
relationship among shareholders, management
and board(s) of director is characterised by the
separation of ownership and management
control.8 Although shareholders are a
company’s economic owners, in public
corporations, they generally do not take part in
the management of the company, but entrust it
to the board(s) of directors and executive
managers. Entrusting executive management
with the day-to-day decisions incidental to the
operation of the company is efficient. This
separation of ownership and management
control, however, also gives rise to significant
risks of corporate mismanagement because of
actual or potential conflicts of interest between
management, the board(s) of directors and
shareholders. To address these actual and
potential conflicts, the system of corporate
governance of a stock corporation creates a
system of checks and balances throughout the
corporate decision-making processes or may
require that certain decisions be put to a vote of
the shareholders. In this sense, corporate
governance is a “system by which companies
are directed and controlled.”9
Systems of corporate governance can generally
be placed into two categories that can be
distinguished according to the kind of interests
that are taken into account in corporate
decision-making. The first system is referred to
as the “stakeholder model” and is used most
prominently in continental European countries.
The second system is referred to as the
“shareholder model” and is used most
prominently in the United States and the United
Kingdom.
The corporation’s overriding goal in the
stakeholder model is to balance conflicting
interests among all the stakeholders in the
company. Implicit in this model is a
presumption that shareholder value in the long
term will be maximised if corporations
contribute to broad societal goals. Stakeholders
include the shareholders, creditors, suppliers,
employees and customers. In a stakeholder
model, the interests of stakeholders are taken
into account and are sometimes represented, as
in the case of the German Corporations Act
(Aktiengesetz), in the structure of the company
to make sure that the company meets these
broader goals.
The corporation’s overriding goal in the
shareholder model is to maximise shareholder
value. This goal is manifested in law by means
of fiduciary duties owed by the board of
directors to shareholders coupled with the right
of shareholders to bring an action in the case of
a breach of those duties. The shareholders are
the residual claimants on the assets of the
company and therefore management’s primary
duty to the company’s shareholders is to
increase the company’s value and thus the value
of their shares. Other stakeholders generally
receive a fixed return and their claims must be
satisfied before any distribution to shareholders
in the event the company is subject to
bankruptcy proceedings. Under this model, the
board of directors monitors corporate affairs to
maximise the value of the corporation. The
board takes account of the interests of other
stakeholders only as a factor in its deliberations
as to what is in the long-term interest of
shareholders and there is a presumption that
enhancing shareholder value will further other
societal objectives.
Relevant differences already emerge from a
rough comparison of the two models. In the
8 A. Berle and G. Means, “The Modern Corporation and Private
Property”, New York, Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. (1932 and
1968); M. Jensen and W. Meckling, “Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs, and Ownership
Structure”, in 3 Journ. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976); E. Fama, “Agency
Problems and the Theory of the Firm”, in 88 Journ. Pol. Econ. 288
(1980); A. Schleifer and R. W. Vishny, “A Survey of Corporate
Governance”, 52 J. Fin., pp. 737-754 (1997).
9 This definition is given by the Cadbury Committee in its final
report “The Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance” of
December 1992. The “Report of the High Level Group of
Company Law Experts” on a modern regulatory framework for
company law in Europe of 4 November 2002 (the “Winter
Report”) considers corporate governance as a system rooted
partly in company law and partly in wider laws, practices and
market structures (see page 44). See also the “OECD Principles
of Corporate Governance” (1999), as revised in 2004, which
notes that “corporate governance involves a set of relationships
between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders
and other stakeholders.”9
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shareholder model, the fact that the board is
required to take into account the interests of the
economic owners of a company (i.e. the
shareholders) and is only held accountable to
them could lead to fewer conflicts of interest at
the level of the board of directors than in the
stakeholder model. The stakeholder model, on
the other hand, while potentially leading to
greater conflicts of interest within corporate
decision-making processes, may result in
corporate policies that contribute more directly
to broad social policies and objectives. In this
sense, a country with a stakeholder model uses
its corporate governance policies to achieve
societal objectives not solely related to the day-
to-day operations and objectives of companies.
The model of corporate governance chosen by a
jurisdiction is generally reflected in its
company law, which sets out binding legal
requirements relating to the management and
operation of companies. Additionally, public or
private organisations in most jurisdictions have
adopted one or more corporate governance
codes, which may or may not be legally
binding.10 Governance requirements may also
be addressed in the standards that must be met
to list the securities of a company on an
organised securities market. However,
notwithstanding the proliferation of national
codes and principles relating to corporate
governance, there remains a certain level of
dissatisfaction internationally regarding
corporate governance practices generally and a
considerable amount of work is ongoing both at
national and international levels in this area.
Governance failures, particularly relating to the
relationship of companies to their external
auditors, played a role in some recent high-
profile incidents of securities fraud and have
prompted an extensive national and
international review of governance
arrangements concerning the relationship of
companies to their auditors and of arrangements
for regulation and oversight of the auditing
profession generally. The European
Commission also recently proposed a new
Directive on the statutory audit of annual
accounts and consolidated accounts of
companies in the European Union that includes
governance requirements for the relationship
between companies and their external
auditors.11
International recommendations and standards
on the governance of securities settlement
systems (e.g. CPSS-IOSCO Recommendation
13), without expressing any preference for a
specific model of corporate governance, have
bridged the differences between the shareholder
and stakeholder models by requiring in all cases
that customers’ interests and the public interest
be properly considered in board decision-
making. This may be achieved through internal
corporate governance structures or through
more general, external governance mechanisms,
e.g., regulatory requirements. This approach to
governance of clearing and settlement systems
reflects that stakeholders’ interests are
pronounced if a company’s insolvency would
have a strongly adverse impact on a public
market, as would be the case in the event of the
insolvency of an operator of a securities
clearing or settlement system.
10 See the list of codes and principles maintained by the European
Corporate Governance Institute at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/
index.htm. See also the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development’s “Principles of Corporate Governance”
(2004), which are the internationally recognised standards
relating to corporate governance, at http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf.; “Principles for Auditor
Oversight”, IOSCO Technical Committee (October 2002);
“Principles of Auditor Independence and the Role of Corporate
Governance in Monitoring an Auditor’s Independence”, IOSCO
Technical Committee (October 2002); the work of the
International Federation of Accountants on the development of
international standards on auditing at http://www.ifac.org; and
the work of the European Commission on a new Directive on the
statutory audit of annual accounts at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
internal_market/auditing/officialdocs_en.htm. This paper does
not provide a complete review of all the general work in the field
of corporate governance.
11 The board of directors of a CSD or CCP has a particularly heavy
responsibility to oversee the accounting and auditing processes of
the organisation. A CSD, for example, should conduct a periodic
audit to reconcile the books of the CSD with the books of the issuer
or the official registrar to verify that the total number of securities
reflected on the books of the CSD equals the number of shares
issued on the books of the issuer, as CPSS-IOSCO
Recommendations for securities settlement systems prescribe.
Appropriate internal procedures at board level relating both to the
internal and external accounting function are necessary to ensure
that the system operator makes adequate ongoing disclosure to
shareholders, customers and the public relating to its financial
condition, that the external auditors are independent, and that the
external audit is accurate and objective.10
ECB
Occasional Paper No. 21
October 2004
2.1 THE LEGAL AND REGULATORY STRUCTURE
OF SECURITIES CLEARING AND
SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS
The corporate form of CSDs currently varies
across Europe. Most CSDs are commercial
entities, while four CSDs are organised as
banks: Clearstream Banking Luxembourg, the
national CSD for Luxembourg and an ICSD;
Clearstream Banking Frankfurt, the national
CSD for Germany; Euroclear Bank, an ICSD;
and Keler, the national CSD for Hungary. All
are specifically authorised or licensed to
operate as CSDs under the national law of the
jurisdiction in which they operate. The
legislation of many Member States requires that
a CSD be a commercial entity. The choice of
corporate form has obvious implications for
both the organisation of corporate governance
and the regulation of the CSD.
A non-bank CSD would adopt the general
corporate governance mechanisms of the
jurisdiction in which it operates and would
comply with any specific corporate governance
requirements that constitute conditions for the
maintenance of its licence or authorisation to
operate as a CSD. The general corporate
governance mechanisms and the conditions
relating to corporate governance for
maintaining a CSD licence vary from Member
State to Member State. Member States generally
impose prudential requirements on non-bank
CSDs resembling in many respects those
imposed upon banks or investment firms,
including a requirement that their operations be
subjected to periodic review and inspections.
The regulatory authority that would grant this
non-bank CSD licence may vary depending on
the general institutional arrangements for the
regulation of financial services adopted by a
jurisdiction. In jurisdictions with a single
financial services regulator, the single regulator
would generally issue the CSD’s licence in its
role as securities regulator. In jurisdictions that
have a so-called “twin peaks” model of financial
services regulation in which one authority
(generally the central bank or an arm thereof)
has competence for the licensing and prudential
2 DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
STRUCTURES AND MECHANISMS OF SECURITIES
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supervision of both banks and investment
firms, while another authority (the securities
regulator) has competence over market
regulation and supervision and compliance with
rules governing the conduct of business, the
securities regulator would generally grant the
CSD’s licence to operate. However, in some
jurisdictions, either the Ministry of Finance or
the prudential regulator, or both, may authorise
or license CSDs or may have some explicit or
implicit right to give input into the granting of
the CSD’s licence or into its regulation,
supervision or oversight. Lastly, in
jurisdictions that have adopted a sectoral model
of financial services regulation in which there
are separate and independent authorities for the
banking, securities and insurance sectors, the
securities regulator generally issues the CSD’s
operating licence and would have the primary
competence for its regulation. Additionally,
however, in all jurisdictions, the central bank
generally has either an explicit or an implicit
competence relating to the CSD for government
bonds and a strong interest in the efficacy of the
securities settlement arrangements generally.
The efficacy of these arrangements is critical to
an effective implementation of the central
bank’s monetary policy operations and to its
operation of payment systems.
If a CSD were to be organised as a bank, it
would generally adopt the general corporate
governance mechanisms of the jurisdiction in
which it operates, as well as the specific
corporate governance mechanisms generally
employed by banks in the jurisdiction. Its
compliance with these corporate governance
requirements would normally be subject to
supervision and audit by the banking
supervisor. Proposed directors of these bank
CSDs would generally be subject to fitness and
properness tests and would be approved by the
banking supervisor. Bank examiners would
routinely audit the bank CSD regarding its
capital adequacy and the efficacy of its internal
management reporting system in relation to its
risk management practices and of other internal
controls. This is not to suggest that the
regulatory regime applicable to bank CSDs is11
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superior to that applicable to non-bank CSDs.
As mentioned previously, non-bank CSDs are
generally subject to the same kind of prudential
requirements as bank CSDs and their operations
are also subjected to periodic inspections and
reviews by regulators. Theoretically, with a
banking licence, the CSD could offer banking
services beyond the core functions incidental to
the depository and settlement services typically
offered by a CSD, such as cash and securities
lending and collateral management services.
However, national legislation or the licence or
authorisation of the CSD may prohibit or
constrain the provision of non-core services by
the CSD.12
As with CSDs, the corporate form of CCPs
currently varies across Europe. All operate as
commercial entities except LCH.Clearnet, S.A.,
a subsidiary of LCH.Clearnet Group Limited,
which operates as a bank. The same general
considerations regarding the corporate
governance of CSDs also apply with respect to
CCPs.
2.2 THE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE
The ownership structure of a securities clearing
and settlement system has obvious implications
for its corporate governance as the equity
owners ultimately control the composition of
the board of directors, subject to any regulatory
requirements regarding board composition. The
ownership structure of securities clearing and
settlement systems varies considerably around
the world. The system may be owned by
customers that are the main participants in the
system’s operations or by third parties and may
be operated either on a non-profit or a for-profit
basis. The system may also be owned by other
entities involved in trade execution, clearing,
settlement or the guaranteeing of securities
transactions, and may be incorporated into a
group structure either as a partially or wholly
owned subsidiary.
The table in Annex II shows that, in the fifteen
Member States of the European Union prior to
the accession of new Member States on 1 May
2004, the CSDs of twelve Member States are
subsidiary entities owned within a company
group, while the CSDs of three Member States
(Austria, Denmark and Sweden) are held
independent of a company group. Of the twelve
CSDs held within a company group (including,
for Belgium, both Euroclear Bank and Euronext
CIK), eight are held by a company group
organised around the official stock exchange of
the jurisdictions in which they operate (or its
holding company) and four (Euroclear Bank for
Belgium and for Irish government bonds,
Euroclear France, CrestCo for the United
Kingdom and for Irish equities, and Euroclear
Nederland) are organised around the ICSD,
Euroclear. The other ICSD, Clearstream
Luxembourg, is held within a company group
centred on the Deutsche Börse. The holding of a
CSD within a company group centred on the
regulated markets of a jurisdiction generally
reflects the creation of a vertical silo for trade
execution, clearing and settlement, generally on
a national basis. The holding of national CSDs
within the Euroclear group reflects a horizontal
functional consolidation at the level of the
CSDs.
The CSDs in the ten countries admitted to the
European Union on 1 May 2004, many of which
were organised after the fall of the Berlin Wall
in 1989, are generally owned by a governmental
entity (the Ministry of Finance or the national
central bank) or by governmental entities and
the official exchanges.
Among the CCPs in Europe, five are
commercial entities operating as divisions of
the exchanges for which they provide central
counterparty services. Four of these five
12 The issue of the ownership of a CSD offering these non-core
services is somewhat controversial. Given its place at the heart
of the financial infrastructure of the securities industry, both
CPSS/IOSCO, as the international standard-setter for securities
settlement systems, and ESCB/CESR, as the European standard-
setter for those systems, have adopted strict standards regarding
the risks that CSDs should take and the management of those
risks. The board of directors of a CSD bears the primary
responsibility for ensuring that any non-core services it offers
and its risk management programme regarding those services
comply with these international and Community standards.12
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exchanges (Euronext Lisbon, the Helsinki
Exchanges, MEFF in Spain and
Stockholmsbörsen) are held within a company
group, while the remaining one (the Wiener
Börse) is an independent entity. Four CCPs
(Eurex Clearing in Germany, ADECH in
Greece, CC&G in Italy and FUTOP Clearing in
Denmark) are subsidiary commercial entities
owned within a company group or by an
exchange. Clearing Bank Hanover is a
commercial entity independent of any exchange
or other company group. LCH.Clearnet is
owned 45.1% by exchanges, 45.1% by system
participants, and the balance by the Euroclear
Group. Keler, which provides both depository
and central counterparty services in Hungary, is
owned by the Hungarian NCB (Magyar Nemzeti
Bank) and the official Hungarian exchanges.
2.3 THE SERVICES PROVIDED BY THE
SECURITIES CLEARING OR SETTLEMENT
SYSTEM
2.3.1 THE SERVICES PROVIDED BY CSDS
CSDs typically provide securities account
maintenance, registration services, depository
services and settlement services. The national
CSD is often the official registrar for the
issuers of equities, government bonds and other
financial instruments within its jurisdiction.
Other services provided by CSDs are not
entirely uniform. Examples of other services
include: securities numbering (using ISIN
codes), administration of corporate actions,
interest payment and tax withholding services,
collateral management (for equities settlement,
repos, or derivatives transactions), cash
transfers, foreign exchange services, securities
lending (as agents for CSD participants as
securities borrower and securities lender), trade
matching and confirmation services, order
routing services, settlement and other services
across links with an ICSD or other national
CSDs, and the provision of other information
and data services. As a general principle, these
services are provided without extending
unsecured credit to service recipients. If credit
is extended by a CSD to a system participant, it
is generally subject to both collateral
requirements and limits (see CPSS-IOSCO
Recommendation 9).
The greater the extent of services provided by a
CSD and the greater the operational complexity
in providing those services, the greater the
burden on the CSD’s board of directors. The
board of directors is ultimately responsible for
approving the operational aspects of the
services provided by the CSD, for organising
an internal management reporting system
through which the board can remain apprised of
the CSD’s operations and performance, for
ensuring that any risks undertaken by the CSD
are properly managed, and for ensuring that the
services provided by the CSD interface
appropriately with other service providers
along the value chain of securities settlement
(i.e. other CSDs, ICSDs, CCPs, custodians,
exchanges and other trading platforms,
settlement banks, and registrars).
2.3.2 THE SERVICES PROVIDED BY CCPS
An exchange generally undertakes to provide a
broad array of services relating to trade
execution, clearing, settlement and the
dissemination of trading information and data.
When a CCP is a division of an exchange, it
generally focuses on the provision of central
counterparty services and the related risk
management and audit programmes, although
sometimes the clearing house division of an
exchange may provide services normally
offered by other divisions of an exchange in
other jurisdictions. When the exchange is one
legal entity, which division of the exchange
provides a particular service is not a significant
issue; the legal entity as a whole is liable for all
risks and liabilities undertaken by the exchange
and the clearing house. In general, however,
exchanges, outside the clearing house division,
do not incur significant amounts of debt (except
perhaps for real estate and IT) and do not extend
a significant amount of credit to their customers
or other recipients of their services. Credit risk
is undertaken principally through the clearing13
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house operations. Consequently, the fact that a
CCP is a division of an exchange does not add
materially to the risks undertaken by the
exchange as a CCP and is generally not viewed
as more problematic from a risk management
perspective. In fact, it may permit risks
associated with market operation and clearing to
be better coordinated, a factor that may be
particularly important in derivatives markets.
If a CCP is held within a company group,
generally the CCP focuses on the provision of
its central counterparty services and its related
risk management and audit programmes. In
some cases, however, a CCP may undertake to
provide trade matching and confirmation
services or other data and information services.
In these cases, the kind of services provided by
the CCP may have more significance. A
company group may conclude that it should
conduct only core central counterparty services
in the CCP so that the CCP, as a separate legal
entity, will be insulated from liabilities
associated with other services offered within
the group. Independent CCPs also focus on the
provision of core central counterparty services
and their related risk management and audit
programmes, but may offer other services to
enhance their competitiveness vis-à-vis other
service providers. Whatever the structure in
which a CCP is held, it is incumbent upon the
CCP’s board of directors to ensure that any
risks associated with the provision of non-core
CCP services will not interfere with or
jeopardise the CCP’s provision of its core
central counterparty services.
2.3.3 THE GENERAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
MECHANISMS
The corporate governance mechanisms adopted
by a securities clearing or settlement system
generally reflect the corporate governance
mechanisms employed in the jurisdiction, e.g.
relating to board structure and the use of
specialised board committees. The system will
also be subject to the same accounting standards
as other corporations within its jurisdiction and
the board of directors will have the same degree
of responsibility for ensuring that the processes
by which the accounts of the system are stated
are sound as the boards of corporations
generally. Although there are no best practices
specifically concerning the corporate
governance of clearing and settlement systems,
there are best practice recommendations in all
EU countries relating to corporations generally
or specifically to listed companies. In most
cases, the exchanges in each jurisdiction reflect
the best practice recommendations in their
standards for listing a security for trading on
the exchange. Securities clearing and settlement
systems may or may not be subject to these best
practice recommendations. However, securities
clearing and settlement systems operating in a
particular jurisdiction should adopt the
corporate governance standards or best
practices recommended for companies in that
jurisdiction as such standards or practices
evolve over time. More specifically, securities
clearing and settlement systems should adopt
the best practices recommended for companies
whose securities are publicly listed for trading
on an official market in the jurisdiction,
whether or not the securities of the system
operator are in fact listed for trading. In
particular, securities settlement systems should
adopt the highest standards of corporate
governance with regard to the relationship
between the system operator and its external
auditors and should adopt a conservative
approach in addressing the treatment of any
accounting issues relating to the maintenance of
its books. Corporate governance best practices
may have to be supplemented, however, to meet
more specific governance objectives of the
clearing or settlement system, including risk
management and regulatory policy objectives.14
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3 CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN, AND GOVERNANCE
MECHANISMS FOR, SECURITIES CLEARING AND
SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS
Certain conflicts of interest that arise in the
governance of a securities clearing and
settlement system are common to those arising
in the corporate governance of companies
generally, i.e. the typical conflicts discussed in
the corporate governance literature between
owners and managers. However, other conflicts
of interest arise in the governance of securities
clearing and settlement systems by virtue of the
interests of two other interested groups that
must be taken into account in the decision-
making processes relating to the operation of
the system, i.e. the customers13 and the public
authorities interest.
Corporate governance arrangements generally
create a system of internal checks and balances
to ensure the accountability of board members
and executive management. As noted
previously, CSDs and CCPs generally adopt the
general corporate governance mechanisms
common to the jurisdiction in which they are
organised. One basic objective of these
mechanisms is to permit the shareholders of the
corporation to evaluate the performance of the
board of directors and the executive
management so that they can be held to account.
As noted earlier, two basic systems of corporate
governance predominate: one based on a single
board structure and the other based on a dual
board structure composed of a supervisory
board and a management board. The single
board in single board systems and the
supervisory board in dual board systems are
generally elected by vote of the owners or
shareholders.14 In jurisdictions with dual board
structures, the management board is generally
elected by the supervisory board. In CSDs and
CCPs, the supervisory board usually has
competence, e.g. to oversee the management
generally, to resolve conflicts of interest with
management, and to review and approve
financial statements/annual audit reports. It also
reviews basic policies relating to internal
controls, the systems of internal reporting to
management, and risk management procedures.
In single board systems, management directors
are supervised by independent, non-
management directors. Committees of non-
management directors generally fulfil the
functions allocated to the supervisory board in
dual board systems. Examples of typical board
committees include: nominating committees
(responsible for nominating new members to
the board); compensation committees
(responsible for setting the compensation of
members of management); and audit committees
(responsible for the board’s relationship with
the corporation’s external auditors).15
Nomination, remuneration and audit committees
should be composed of independent directors,
as stressed in the Winter Report.
The potential conflicts of interest between large
and minority shareholders present another
classic problem of corporate governance that
may be addressed in standard corporate
governance arrangements. This can be
accomplished, for example, by means of clauses
in the company statutes to provide minority
shareholders with the opportunity to elect
candidates of their choice to a limited number of
board seats, e.g. by weighting voting rights
differently with respect to certain seats. The
ability to elect a member of the board assures
the minority shareholders that they can be kept
informed of the activities of the company and
that they will have an opportunity to have their
views expressed and taken into account at board
meetings.
13 The term “customers” refers to both system participants and their
customers.
14 However, in some jurisdictions with dual board structures, the
supervisory board may elect its own new members.
15 Many jurisdictions have recently been evaluating the proper
role, organisation and functioning of the audit committee,
particularly in listed companies. See, for example, “Standards
Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees”, US SEC Release
No 33-82209 (April 2003) at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-
8220.htm and the European Commission’s proposal for a
Directive on the statutory audit of annual accounts and
consolidated accounts of companies in the EU at http://
europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/auditing/
officialdocs_en.htm. See also “Principles for Ongoing
Disclosure and Material Development Reporting by Listed
Entities”, IOSCO Technical Committee (October 2002);
“Principles of Auditor Independence and the Role of Corporate
Governance in Monitoring an Auditor’s Independence”, IOSCO
Technical Committee (October 2002); and “Principles for
Auditor Oversight”, IOSCO Technical Committee (October
2002).15
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Notwithstanding the variations in the
organisation of corporate governance across
jurisdictions, the basic system of checks and
balances in typical corporate governance
arrangements allows owners to exercise
oversight and control over the board of
directors and the board of directors, in turn, to
exercise oversight and control over executive
management. The unique features of
governance arrangements for securities
settlement systems relate to steps taken to
incorporate into this basic scheme mechanisms
to provide for oversight and control over the
board of directors and executive management by
customers and the public authorities, acting in
the public interest. Authorities’ requirements in
this regard may deal specifically with corporate
governance or may consist of other types of
regulation or requirements complementing
corporate governance, such as competition law
requirements. In this respect, governance of
securities clearing and settlement systems
reflects a matrix of internal and external, and
private and public mechanisms of control and
oversight.
3.1 MECHANISMS TO ADDRESS THE INTERESTS
OF CUSTOMERS
Several mechanisms are commonly used to
require consideration of the interests of
customers in board decision-making:
– A first mechanism is the organisation of
user-ownership of the CSD or CCP. As the
customers in this case will determine who
will be elected to the board of directors, the
user-owners are generally assured that the
board members they elect will take their
interests into account in their deliberations
and be responsive to their concerns.16 The
ownership structure of a CSD or CCP is
generally determined at the time of the
organisation of the system operator.
However, unless arrangements are made to
offer an ownership position to new
participants that begin to use the system
subsequent to its organisation, new
customers may have difficulty obtaining an
ownership position reflecting their level of
use of the system.
– A second mechanism is the establishment of
board composition requirements by which
certain seats are reserved for representatives
of customers, including non-resident
customers. This mechanism is similar to that
used to protect the interests of minority
shareholders discussed earlier. Board
representation assures customers that they
can be kept informed of the activities of the
system operator and that they will have an
opportunity to have their views expressed
and taken into account in board decision-
making. Board members representing
customers can also act as “witnesses” to the
internal dialogue within the system operator
relating to system operations. LCH.Clearnet
Group Limited is unique in setting aside
board seats for representatives of the trading
platforms for which it clears.
– A third mechanism intended to contribute to
an adequate consideration of customers’
interests, as well as sound and adequate risk
management, is the use of  advisory
committees. Advisory committees are
generally composed of user representatives
16 An example of user-ownership is the CSD for equity securities
and the CCP for equities, US government debt instruments,
mortgage-backed securities, and emerging market debt
instruments in the United States. These have been organised as
subsidiaries and affiliates of the Depository Trust & Clearing
Corporation (DTCC) that is owned by the principal customers of
its subsidiaries’ services. Section 17A(b)(3)(C) of the US
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires that the rules of a
clearing agency assure a fair representation of customers in the
selection of its directors and in the administration of its affairs.
The SEC is also empowered to determine that representation is
fair if customers are afforded a reasonable opportunity to
acquire the voting stock of the clearing agency, directly or
indirectly, in reasonable proportion to their use of the clearing
agency. In effect, while the US Congress did not require that
securities clearing agencies be user-owned, it stated a clear
policy preference for user-ownership. In response, the US
securities industries organised a user-owned organisation to
clear and settle most securities transactions. Only clearing
houses for futures and options were not included within the
structure of the DTCC. See also US SEC Release No 34-16900, 45
F.R. 41920 (17 June 1980) regarding SEC standards for the
registration of clearing agencies. An example of user-ownership
in Europe is the case of Euroclear plc and Euroclear Bank, the
operator of the Euroclear System, also owned by its primary
customers.16
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and a board representative and facilitate a
dialogue between customers and the board.
– A last mechanism is for the board of
directors to solicit the views of customers on
the development of new initiatives regarding
the services provided by the CSD or CCP
through the publication of public
consultation documents.
3.2 MECHANISMS TO ADDRESS THE PUBLIC
INTEREST
The public interest in the operation of securities
clearing and settlement systems is generally
protected through the regulatory requirements
of the competent authorities. In all jurisdictions,
a licence or authorisation is required to provide
securities clearing and settlement services. The
requirements to obtain such a licence or
authorisation are laid down in laws or
regulations. These laws and regulations
typically address the following matters that bear
on the corporate governance of the system
operator:
– requirements relating to the company form,
i.e. that system operators must be a company
limited by shares or a bank;
– a review of the company statutes and by-
laws;
– a fitness and properness review of members
of the board of directors and executive
management;
– control of shareholdings and changes in
shareholdings; and
– a review of the operational plan, internal
control arrangements, system rules and risk
management programme of the system
operator.17
Some competent authorities specifically take
into account the arrangements to manage
conflicts of interest in the operation of the
system.18 However, although a review of
corporate governance arrangements per se may
not be specifically addressed in the
requirements for authorisation of all competent
authorities, such a review is implicitly
undertaken through an examination of the
company statutes, the by-laws, the operational
plan, internal control arrangements and system
rules. The competent authorities also generally
receive periodic reports from system operators
and have a right of inspection through which
governance arrangements can be reviewed on an
ongoing basis. Lastly, the competent authority
may have authority to review decisions relating
to the fees charged by the system operator.19
In some jurisdictions, board composition
requirements may also be used to address public
interest concerns by reserving seats on the
board for members designated to represent the
public interest. Such requirements may be
imposed by regulation or be voluntarily adopted
by the CSD or CCP itself. Furthermore, such
public interest directors may be nominated by
the board of directors or be appointed by a
public official.
17 The laws and regulations applicable to securities clearing and
settlement systems also generally include substantive provisions
relating to the operation of those systems, such as the
specification of operating hours, the kind of securities that may
be listed within the system, requirements relating to system
access, minimum capital requirements and record-keeping
requirements, among others.
18 See, for example, Section 2.4 of the UK Financial Services
Authority Handbook on Recognised Investment Exchanges and
Recognised Clearing Houses.
19 However, this review generally does not rise to the level of a
rate-making review of the kind undertaken with respect to the
charges of a public utility. Rather, the competent authority
generally reviews decisions relating to fee-setting to determine
that the system operator has set fees within a reasonable range.
See, for example, US Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section
17A(b)(3)(D) and Article 81(3) of the Italian Legislative
Decree 58 of 24 February 1998 - Consolidated Law on Financial
Intermediation, pursuant to Articles 8 and 21 of Law 52 of 6
February 1996 (as amended by Legislative Decree 37 of 6
February 2004). See also Recommendation 15, CPSS/IOSCO,
“Recommendations for securities settlement systems” (2001);
and Recommendation 11, CPSS/IOSCO, “Recommendations for
central counterparties” (2004).17
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3.3 SPECIFIC CASES OF CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST
3.1.1 POTENTIAL CONFLICTS RELATING TO RISK
MANAGEMENT
The main function of a CCP is to undertake and
manage credit risk vis-à-vis both parties to a
securities transaction; that is, it is a mechanism
to establish or enhance the creditworthiness of
system participants to facilitate trading on a
market. A CCP by definition interposes itself
into a nexus of risk contracts and must manage
those risks. Consequently, the management of
risk represents a critical function in a CCP. As a
failure in a CCP’s risk management programme
may affect other linked and interdependent
systems, there is a public interest in the quality
and management of a CCP’s risk management
programme and effective governance
arrangements represent one component of this
programme. In this respect, governance
arrangements should address some specific
concerns. This is particularly relevant in cases
in which the CCP is not a separate, specialised
legal entity, but is a division of an exchange.
The main issues can be summarised as follows.
First, it is important that the effectiveness of
risk management decisions not be impaired by
extraneous considerations relating to the other
business activities of the CCP. This requires,
on one hand, a clear and legally sound
separation/segregation of the financial
resources of the CCP used for the management
of the risks stemming from each of the CCP’s
various activities.20  On the other hand, it is
necessary that the decision-making processes
governing the application of the CCP’s default
procedures be absolutely independent and that
those responsible for the decisions be fully
accountable. Second, to the extent that the
CCP’s customers own the CCP and contribute
financial resources to its default fund, the
decision-making processes relating to the
declaration of a default and the use of the
default fund must be organised in such a manner
as to eliminate customers’ improper influence
on, or ability improperly to delay, decisions
addressing a default at the time of the default.
CSDs generally do not undertake credit risk to
system participants incident to their provision
of core settlement services, although they may
organize collateral arrangements or guarantee
funds to minimize the credit risk undertaken by
system participants. If, however, the operator
of a securities settlement system offers in
addition banking and other non-core services,
such as collateralised or uncollateralised credit
lines, then the CSD undertakes credit and
liquidity risks. If those other non-core services
are profitable, CSDs have an incentive to
maximise the level of the non-core services they
offer in order to increase their profits and to
reduce the costs relating to the management of
the risks associated with these services. A
tension may exist between this profit
maximisation objective and the necessity to
assure the uninterrupted provision of CSD core
services in all market foreseeable conditions.
Credit and liquidity risks related to the non-core
banking services could indeed have spillover
effects on the core settlement services and,
thus, jeopardise the integrity of the system.
Therefore, robust risk management should be
part of the governance arrangements to ensure
that core settlement functions are not
jeopardised.
The competent authorities generally review
these risk management arrangements as part of
their review of the corporate governance
arrangements and internal rules and controls of
the system operator to protect the public interest
by verifying the integrity of these
arrangements.
3.3.2 FINANCIAL GROUP-RELATED ISSUES
One result of the recent consolidation within the
trading, clearing and settlement infrastructure
within Europe has been the formation of
20 This is not meant to suggest that separate financial resources
must be maintained for each type of product cleared by a CCP.
Where risks are adequately managed, cross-product clearing
may create efficiencies for the benefit of customers.18
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complex financial groups whose operations cut
across the entire value chain of the trading,
clearing and settlement processes for securities
transactions. A CSD or CCP held within a
financial group faces unique issues of corporate
governance arising from actual or potential
conflicts of interest due to the possibility that
management of the parent institution will
pursue the interests of the parent company or
other affiliates at the expense of the interests of
the CSD or CCP. Consideration of the corporate
governance mechanisms of a CSD held within a
company group generally requires an analysis
of the corporate governance mechanisms in
place within the entire group structure, but
particularly of those at the level of the parent
company, where decisions on the general
policies and business strategies of the entire
group may be taken.
The typical case of a financial group in the
securities settlement infrastructure is that of a
vertically integrated silo where a stock
exchange is also the owner of the clearing and
the settlement system. A few examples of
conflicts of interest that might arise in the
operation of a vertically integrated silo can be
outlined:
First, decisions concerning the distribution of
profits or investments in systems can privilege
the stock exchange over the securities
settlement system and its customers.
Second, to the extent that the IT infrastructure
for trading, clearing and settlement is based on
a single IT system used by the financial group,
it is possible that investments in superior
systems that are available for securities
settlement systems will not be made, thereby
impairing the efficiency of the settlement
system and increasing costs to customers. In
other words, a single IT infrastructure is not
necessarily more efficient than three separate
“specialised” infrastructures.
Third, a policy of price bundling can lead to a
subsidisation of the provision of one service
(e.g. trade execution services) through the
charging of inflated fees for other services (e.g.
post-trade processing). In this way, the fixed
costs relating to one service can be recovered
through charges for other services. This
practice may be facilitated if the other service is
provided under monopoly or quasi-monopoly
conditions. The same problem however may
also arise when a single institution provides
services of a different nature, making use or not
of the same infrastructure. This is the case when
a CSD provides credit or securities lending
facilities.
Fourth, obstacles to a horizontal consolidation
of the post-trade processing infrastructure,
either domestically or cross-border, may be
thrown up to the extent that such a
consolidation would impair the competitive
position of the stock exchange.
Fifth, the provision of netting or central
counterparty services by a CCP outside the
financial group may be prevented if the CCP
would be in competition with the CSD.
Extensive use of a CCP may indeed reduce the
number and volume of transactions settled
within the CSD, as well as the need for
participants in the CSD to make use of other
(e.g. banking) facilities provided by the CSD.
Sixth, in the event of a default, the system
operator may make decisions that favour
financially one class of persons, such as
owners, exchange members or domestic
members, at the expense of other persons, such
as non-owners or non-domestic customers.
Horizontal groups may also face similar,
additional conflicts of interest relative to
entities that act on a stand-alone basis.
Because the formation of these financial groups
is relatively recent, no specific mechanisms
have yet been developed to address the
particular conflicts of interest that they may
face. Moreover, it is not clear that the traditional
corporate governance arrangements and the19
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supplemental governance arrangements that
have been developed relating to securities
clearing and settlement systems generally, as
described earlier, are adequate to ensure that
these conflicts of interest are appropriately
resolved. Consequently, further consideration
by the public authorities of the implications of
the formation of these financial groups and the
adequacy of their governance arrangements
would be appropriate.
3.3.3 CONFLICTS OF INTEREST BETWEEN
DOMESTIC AND NON-RESIDENT
CUSTOMERS AND PARTICIPANTS
The increase in cross-border trading that has
accompanied efforts to complete the internal
market within Europe has also raised new
issues relating to the interests of non-resident
customers and system participants vis-à-vis
those of domestic customers and participants.
In general, the issues concerning adequate
representation of the interests of non-domestic
participants are similar in nature to the issues
normally arising to ensure adequate
representation of “minority” groups.
Given the current consolidation of the securities
settlement infrastructure within the European
Union, CSDs and CCPs established in one
Member State may primarily serve participants
and customers from other Member States or
other countries. Particularly if the shareholders
of the settlement system are residents of the
Member State in which the system is
established, mechanisms should be instituted in
the system’s decision-making processes to take
into account the needs and interests of those
non-domestic participants and customers. Such
mechanisms should be designed to ensure that
the interests and needs of non-domestic
participants and customers are given
consideration equal to those of domestic
participants and customers. In particular, non-
domestic participants should be adequately
represented on the board or in other decision-
making and advisory groups.21
In Section 1, reference was made to best
practice recommendations relating to
governance to be followed by domestic
companies. While, over the last decade, there
has been considerable convergence in these best
practice recommendations within the EU, there
remain some substantial differences in the
ownership structure of listed companies within
the EU which bear significantly on the
mechanisms employed in particular
jurisdictions to protect the rights of minority
shareholders and to provide transparency
relating to corporate governance arrangements.
These best practice recommendations also do
not adequately address the unique needs and
interests of non-domestic customers of
securities clearing and settlement systems. In
order to enhance governance at Community
level, there are ongoing efforts to provide for a
collective responsibility of board members for
financial statements and key non-financial
information, to increase transparency regarding
intra-group relations and transactions with
related parties, and to improve disclosures
concerning corporate governance practices. As
regards the corporate governance of securities
clearing and settlement systems, these
initiatives should refer more explicitly to the
fact that, if stakeholders are in different
countries, the need for clarity about the
responsibility of the board members and non-
executive directors and about corporate
governance in general is more pronounced.
3.3.4 CONFLICTS AMONG PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
INTERESTS
The monopoly or quasi-monopoly position of a
securities clearing or settlement system has
implications for both the public interest and
21 The relevant competent authorities should also consider in
advance optimal arrangements to address the cross-border
implications of a default, e.g. the manner in which liquidity might
be provided on a cross-border basis to system participants and
customers.20
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customers’ interests. In the policy debate
regarding the ongoing reorganisation of the
securities settlement infrastructure in Europe,
two main issues in this respect have drawn the
attention of public authorities.
The first issue relates to developments in the
kinds of services offered by institutions active
in the securities settlement infrastructure. Some
settlement systems are now offering services
that were historically offered by other kinds of
service providers under different conditions of
competition. For example, an (I)CSD, which
has the legal status of a bank, mainly provides
settlement services, but has also begun to
provide other services, such as credit and
collateral management services, that were
historically and are still offered by banks or
global custodians. An ICSD, in such a position,
may bundle or tie its provision of banking
services to the use of its settlement services.
However, the banks and custodians which are in
competition with the ICSDs in relation to these
banking services may not be able to do so under
equivalent conditions of competition due to
variations in their regulation or legal status vis-
à-vis the ICSD. Another example of bundling or
tying of services is the case of a stock exchange
that requires that transactions executed on the
exchange be settled solely in an affiliated CSD.
This can be due partly to legal barriers, e.g.
fiscal barriers or local regulations, or to
“rigidity” in the IT infrastructure (or an absence
of standardisation) that can prevent or make
much more costly the provision of similar
services by other companies.
The second issue relates to the fact that a
financial group can create artificial and anti-
competitive links among the different services
provided by the group. For instance, the use of
a CSD can be reserved only to participants in an
affiliated stock exchange.
As is the case with regard to the formation of
financial groups generally discussed
previously, it is unclear whether existing
governance arrangements relating to securities
clearing and settlement systems are sufficient,
in themselves, to resolve the public interest
issues that have arisen as a result of the
consolidation within the settlement
infrastructure. System operators compete
within the existing legal and regulatory
framework for securities clearing and
settlement systems and can legitimately seek to
obtain an advantage over their competitors as
long as their operations comply with those laws
and regulations. Current competition
requirements may constrain certain kinds of
anti-competitive behaviour, but in the absence
of a harmonised regulatory regime at European
level, it is unclear whether equivalent
competitive conditions among the various kinds
of service providers within the securities
clearing and settlement infrastructure can be
obtained given the disparities among the current
national regulations of the Member States.21
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4 OTHER GENERAL POLICY APPROACHES BY
AUTHORITIES RELATING TO SYSTEM
GOVERNANCE
4.1 TRANSPARENCY
The system of governance of entities subject to
regulation and oversight, such as securities
clearing and settlement systems, differs from
the corporate governance mechanisms of
unregulated firms both in scope and objectives.
Therefore, while unregulated firms may
voluntarily disclose corporate governance
arrangements or be required to disclose
corporate governance arrangements pursuant to
the listing standards of exchanges or securities
regulations applicable to issuers, public
authorities should require that corporate
governance arrangements for securities clearing
and settlement systems be transparent, that
measures be taken to organise a dialogue
between customers/participants and the board,
and that the board be accountable, internally and
externally, for its decisions. Transparency of
corporate governance arrangements contributes
essential information to customers for their
evaluation of the risks associated with the use
of the system. Authorities’ requirements may be
of a dual nature: soft law, in the form of
recommendations and best practice guidance, or
specific laws and regulations.
Securities clearing and settlement systems
generally disclose their corporate governance
arrangements as well as their ownership
structure in their annual reports and on their
websites. Disclosure of corporate governance
arrangements may be made in fulfilment of
regulatory requirements, e.g. those relating to
licensing or authorisation; in fulfilment of
requirements imposed by stock exchanges
where the system operator is listed; or
voluntarily for business reasons. Some systems
have published reports demonstrating their
compliance with market-initiated
recommendations, such as the G30’s action plan
for clearing and settlement of 2003. Many
securities settlement systems also have
published a disclosure framework report for
securities settlement systems adopted by the
BIS/IOSCO in 1997. While corporate
governance is not addressed as a specific topic
in this disclosure framework, it provides
relevant corporate governance information
through the systems’ answers to questions
regarding its organisation and ownership
structure. Through answers to questions on the
systems’ rules and procedures, the systems
provide information about the core of their
corporate governance mechanisms.
The relevant websites generally provide
information regarding the ownership structure,
percentage shareholdings, board structures, the
work and composition of internal committees,
and, in some cases, the financial group
structure. Although the current disclosure
practices relating to corporate governance
provide a good deal of information to the
public, certain deficiencies are also apparent.
First, the information currently posted by
securities clearing and settlement systems
relating to governance varies considerably from
system to system. Some systems post detailed
governance information, while the disclosures
by others are terse and lacking in detail. As the
corporate governance arrangements of systems
bear significantly on any assessment of whether
the system is properly taking the public interest
into account in its decision-making processes, a
system should properly make disclosures to
demonstrate the manner in which the public
interest is considered in its corporate
governance arrangements. At a minimum, clear
disclosures should be made relating to the risk
management programme of the system and the
manner in which conflicts of interest between
owners, the board of directors, the customers
and the public authorities interest are
addressed.22 Moreover, when customers groups
are established to represent the interests of the
customers, the following should be made clear
22 Disclosures relating to risk management should be adequate to
permit participants and customers to assess the risks associated
with using the system and should cover, for example, the sources
and extent of funds available to cover a participant default, the
sequence in which funds from different sources will be assessed
to cover a default, the rights and liabilities of the system and of
defaulting and non-defaulting participants upon a default, the
mechanisms used to safeguard the customer funds and collateral
of non-defaulting participants, and the implications of the
insolvency of a system participant or customer on the rights and
liabilities of other participants and customers.22
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ex ante: (i) the criteria used to select the
participants in the customers group; (ii) its
precise functions; and (iii) the extent of the
impact of the work of these groups on the
decision-making process. In particular, where
the advice of the customers group has not been
followed, it would be worthwhile for clearing
and settlement systems to make the reasons
transparent.
Second, disclosures relating to corporate
governance of securities clearing and settlement
systems held within a financial group often only
describe the corporate governance arrangements
at the level of the parent company. Given the
public interest in the operation of these
systems, specific disclosures should be made
concerning corporate governance at the level of
the system. Furthermore, any relationships or
agreements between members of the financial
group which bear on the financial condition of
the system or on its ongoing ability to fulfil its
intended functions in the market in which it
operates should also be disclosed.
Third, disclosures now made voluntarily or at
the discretion of the system may be updated
only at irregular intervals and may, at a given
point in time, become stale and outdated. To
evaluate the risks associated with using a
system, customers and public authorities should
have current accurate information at all times
regarding the corporate governance of the
system, particularly relating to its risk
management programme.
Fourth, the adequacy or accuracy of these
voluntary disclosures may be questioned, as
competitors sometimes complain about the
quality of the disclosures of other systems.
To address these deficiencies, it would be
advisable for competent authorities to develop
specific standards relating to the disclosure of
corporate governance arrangements by
securities clearing and settlement systems. The
development of standards might appropriately
be included in the work of the joint working
group of the European System of Central Banks
and the Committee of European Securities
Regulators relating to the regulation,
supervision and oversight of clearing and
settlement in the Community. As noted
previously however, looking forward, a strong
case can be made for the development of
harmonised requirements relating to the
authorisation and regulation of securities
clearing and settlement systems within the EU.
Requirements relating to the transparency of
corporate governance could easily be
incorporated into such a harmonised regime as a
condition for obtaining and maintaining an
authorisation or licence to operate.
4.2 REQUIREMENT FOR EFFECTIVE
GOVERNANCE IRRESPECTIVE OF THE
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE
The corporate governance arrangements of a
securities settlement system are effective when
those arrangements lead to sound business
decisions and to an appropriate balancing of the
interests of the various stakeholders in
corporate decision-making. The issue is not so
much whether the system operator uses a
particular corporate governance mechanism to
achieve this balancing of interests, but whether
the combination of mechanisms adopted by the
system operator in the aggregate prompt or
cause an appropriate balancing of those
interests. As the legal form of an entity
operating a CSD or CCP may be a bank or a
non-bank, corporate governance mechanisms
may take various forms. In the absence of
further harmonization at Community level,
public authorities should focus on the
effectiveness of the corporate governance
mechanisms chosen by a system operator, rather
than on the form of the legal entity.
Furthermore, public authorities should in fact
focus on whether system operators achieve
sound management of the system and on
whether system operators promote the public
policy objectives of the public authorities, such
as the promotion of efficiency, technological
innovation, transparency, and fair competition
while leaving it to the market itself to develop23
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the overall structure of the settlement
infrastructure.
As shown in Annex II, the ownership structure
of CSDs and CCPs may take several forms
ranging from user-owned entities to for-profit,
publicly traded entities. It is for the business
judgement of the entities themselves to decide
whether they should attract a particular type of
investor through a particular ownership
structure, and not for regulators, as the second
Giovannini Report points out. The authorities
should not discourage particular ownership
structures if they adequately take account of the
interests of customers and the public authorities
interest. This is particularly the case since the
legal form in which CSDs and CCPs may
incorporate varies from banks to stock
corporations depending on the jurisdiction.
In addition, public authorities have policy
concerns in ensuring that risks relating to non-
core services of CSDs and CCPs do not impair
their core clearing and settlement activities. If
the corporate governance code in a jurisdiction
is not legally binding, but is a voluntary code
(as in the case of the German Corporate
Governance Code), and the jurisdiction requires
a company to explain the reasons why it has not
complied with the voluntary code, authorities
should be vested with powers to request from a
CSD or CCP an explanation as to why its
corporate governance mechanisms are adequate,
taking into account its size, its ownership
structure, the types of markets it serves, and the
geographical scope of its services (i.e. domestic
or cross-border).
4.3 COMPETITION ISSUES
Public authorities also have an interest in
ensuring that securities settlement system
operators do not engage in anti-competitive
behaviour and do not abuse their dominant
position in the market-place to the detriment of
customers and other competitors. Public
authorities’ policy objectives relate to fair
pricing, fair and objective access and exit
criteria, cost efficiencies and establishing
adequate service levels for customers and
participants. Free and fair competition in
general promotes both cost efficiencies and
innovation. Business practices of system
operators that unreasonably restrict competition
may prevent the organisation of optimal
clearing and settlement arrangements at the
expense of customers and to the detriment of the
broader economy.
Article 82 of the Treaty establishing the
European Community prohibits an abuse of a
dominant position in the Community or a
substantial part of it to the extent that it affects
trade between the Member States. Determining
whether an undertaking holds a dominant
position requires a definition of the relevant
market, both from a geographical perspective
and from the standpoint of the product or
service, and an examination of the position of
the undertaking in respect to that market. A
dominant position is a position of economic
strength enjoyed by an undertaking which
enables it to prevent effective competition being
maintained on the relevant market by giving it
the power to behave to an appreciable extent
independently of its competitors, customers and
ultimately its consumers.23 The fact that the
dominant position results from the conferral of
special or exclusive rights by a Member State
does not obviate the prohibition in Article 82.24
As noted earlier, because CCPs and CSDs are
granted special or exclusive rights to provide
clearing and settlement services in the
jurisdictions in which they operate, and because
of the economies of scale associated with their
operations, they often acquire a dominant
position on those markets. A dominant position
clearly would result, for example, if a CSD
were the only entity authorised as a CSD within
a jurisdiction and national law required local
issuers to use the CSD as a registrar for its
23 See Case T-128/98, Aéroports de Paris v Commission (2000), ECR
II-3929, §147. See generally K. Lenaerts & P. Van Nuffel,
“Constitutional Law of the European Union” (R. Bray, Ed), Sweet
and Maxwell (London 1999), p. 198.
24 See Case 311/84, CBEM v CLT and IPB (1985), ECR 3261, §18.24
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dematerialised securities. In such
circumstances, the use of the services of the
CSD represents the only manner to obtain rights
in securities registered at the CSD vis-à-vis the
issuer and effectively requires all traders to
access in some manner the services of the
CSD.25 Similarly, market rules may require, for
legitimate reasons relating to market operation,
that all trades on a particular market be
submitted to a single CCP. Obviously, such a
CCP has a monopoly and a dominant position
with respect to the provision of central
counterparty services on that market.26
Moreover, it is clear that several practices in
which CSDs or CCPs may attempt to engage
would constitute an abuse of a dominant
position. For example, the following practices
generally would constitute an abuse of a
dominant position if not undertaken for
legitimate reasons relating to the proper
operation of the capital markets:
– A CSD’s denial of access to settlement
services to traders that execute trades on
non-favoured execution platforms to benefit
a trade execution platform operated by its
affiliate within a financial group.27
– A CSD’s denial of access to downstream
competitors that require access to the
settlement services of the CSD to effectively
compete on downstream markets, i.e. a
CSD’s denial of access to a settlement
system to an ICSD, another CSD, or a
custodian which competed with the CSD or a
group affiliate on the market of the CSD or
another market.
– A CSD’s or CCP’s tying of the pricing of, or
access to, settlement or clearing services to
the use of other services provided by an
affiliate within a financial group (e.g. the
trade execution services of an exchange or
other trading platform).
– Subsidising the provision of other services
through the pricing of settlement or central
counterparty services (using fees charged
for clearing to subsidise the operation of an
exchange or other trading platform).28
One way to avoid abuses of a dominant position
in the securities settlement infrastructure is to
put in place rules which allow for open access
to the infrastructure. A right of open access is
provided for in the new Directive on markets in
financial instruments.29 Open access ensures
the right of investment firms to have access to
clearing and settlement facilities outside the
Member State of their establishment on the
same objective, transparent and non-
discriminatory grounds as domestic ones. The
Directive requires that regulated markets allow
their members or participants to clear and settle
their transactions through the clearing and
settlement service providers chosen by them.
Regulatory authorities may obviate that choice
only if the necessary links between the chosen
system and other necessary systems do not exist
to ensure efficient and economic settlement of
the transaction or the technical conditions
relating to the services to be provided by the
service provider chosen by the member or
participant are not such as to allow a smooth
and orderly functioning of the market.
4.4 OVERSIGHT
The competence of the various public
authorities that have an interest in securities
settlement systems is generally defined in law
or legislation. Sometimes, however, a public
authority may not have an explicit competence
25 The Giovannini Group recommended that the practice of
requiring issuers to use the local CSD should be abandoned in
favour of allowing the issuer to choose the CSD which will act as
the registrar or depository for its shares. This would also have the
effect of allowing an issuer to choose the regulator that would be
responsible for regulation and oversight of its registrar and
depository relationships.
26 See Case 311/84, CBEM v CLT and IPB (1985), ECR 3261, §23-
25.
27 This would constitute the application of dissimilar conditions to
equivalent transactions with other trading parties as described in
Article 82 (c). See Case C-163/99, Portugal v Commission
(2001), ECR I-2613, §46.
28 See Case T-175/99, UPS Europe v Commission, Rec. (2002), p.II-
1915, §62.
29 Official Journal L145/1, 30.4.2004, Articles 34 and 35.25
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regarding settlement systems, but by tradition
or practice is involved formally or informally in
the regulation or oversight of settlement
systems. This is often the case with respect to
central banks, which may have no explicitly
stated competence over securities settlement
systems, but may influence their operations as a
user, e.g. in its monetary policy operations or
through the operation of a large-value payment
system. By tradition, if not by explicit
competence, central banks often take an interest
in every aspect of their jurisdiction’s economy
in their monetary policy assessment. Also by
tradition, central banks take an interest in any
risk in the financial system that may have
systemic consequences and in the operation of
government bond markets.
Even if an explicit competence over particular
matters is expressly conferred on a particular
public authority by law or legislation, it is
incumbent upon all interested public authorities
to cooperate in the regulation and oversight of
securities clearing and settlement systems. To
give an example, competition law authorities
must assess whether agreements on prices in the
settlement infrastructure are consistent with
competition law requirements and policies.
Nevertheless, the fairness of pricing policies of
settlement service providers and the effect of
prices on access to the settlement infrastructure
are issues for regulators as well as central
banks in their capacity as overseers.30 In this
regard, it is essential that all interested public
authorities organise their activities such that the
supervision and oversight of settlement systems
addresses the legitimate concerns of each of the
public authorities effectively. This is
particularly so where systems are linked cross-
border and the public authorities of multiple
jurisdictions have an interest in the operation of
the linked systems. Cooperation among
authorities in this regard may be formal or
informal, provided that it is effective,
transparent and clear.
4.5 COMPLETING THE INTERNAL MARKET
RELATING TO SECURITIES CLEARING AND
SETTLEMENT
Given the national variations and the
inadequacies in current governance
arrangements relating to securities clearing and
settlement in the Community, EU institutions,
in cooperation with competent national
authorities, should consider the development of
a harmonised regime which would address the
public interest in, and which would ensure
equivalent conditions of competition for the
operation of, the securities settlement
infrastructure. Obtaining equivalent conditions
of competition in this field should result in the
most optimal clearing and settlement
arrangements within Europe and would
complete the internal market relating to
securities clearing and settlement, as
contemplated by the Treaty establishing the
European Community.
One approach to developing such a harmonised
regime would be to use the regulatory model
reflected in the Consolidated Banking
Directive31 and the Directive on Markets in
Financial Instruments (formerly the Investment
Services Directive)32 – that is, a minimum
substantive harmonisation of regulatory
requirements, including requirements relating
to corporate governance, with respect to each
post-trade processing service provided along
the value chain of securities clearing and
30 The organisation of competence for the competition law aspects
of clearing organisations in the United States is interesting in this
regard. In the United States, when approving the authorisation of
a clearing organisation, the Securities and Exchange Commission
and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission are required to
assess the impact of the proposed operations of the clearing
organisation on competition. An authorisation of a clearing
organisation carries with it a conclusion that any negative effects
of its proposed operations on competition are justifiable in the
context of the operation of the market. These determinations by
the market authorities do not obviate the competence of the US
Department of Justice to enforce the antitrust laws of the United
States, but the Justice Department would likely give great weight
to the conclusions of the market authority relating to the effects
of the clearing organisation’s operations on competition. See
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §17A(b)(3)(I) and US
Commodity Exchange Act, §7A-1(c)(2)(N) and 7A-1(3).
31 Official Journal L 126, 26.5.2000, p.1.
32 Official Journal L 145, 30.4.2004, p.1.26
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settlement sufficient to justify mutual
recognition of the regulatory authorisations to
provide such service granted in each Member
State; the availability of a passport to provide
each such service throughout the Community
based on a home country authorisation;
regulation and oversight by the home country
regulator or supervisor; and a requirement that
home and host national authorities cooperate
and share information relating to the regulation
of the operations of the service provider. The
objective of such a harmonised regime should
be to ensure that each kind of service provided
along the value chain of securities clearing and
settlement is regulated in a substantively similar
way throughout the Community, thereby
obtaining equivalent conditions of competition
with respect to the provision of each service.
The challenge in this regard is that the same
service may currently be provided by entities
with different kinds of regulatory
authorisations, subject to different kinds of
regulatory requirements, and with varying
national institutional arrangements for their
regulation and oversight. Consequently, it may
prove difficult to “segregate out” the various
kinds of services provided from a regulatory
perspective. If such a regulatory segregation of
services cannot be obtained such that the same
service may continue to be provided under
different kinds of regulatory authorisations, the
regulatory requirements relating to that service
under each kind of authorisation would need to
be coordinated and harmonised, as was done in
the case of the investment services activities of
banks and investment firms under the Banking
Directive and the Directive on Markets in
Financial Instruments. Any Community
instrument in this field should also provide for
appropriate oversight authority over securities
clearing and settlement systems by the
European System of Central Banks and other
national central banks within the Community
relating to their monetary policy operations and
their operation of large-value payment systems
and should take into account existing
Community instruments relating to clearing and
settlement, such as the Settlement Finality
Directive.33
Consideration of appropriate conditions of
competition within the settlement infrastructure
would also need to give due weight to factors
relating to the proper functioning of markets,
which, in some cases, may require that
competition in the provision of post-trade
processing services be limited or constrained.
Any harmonisation of regulatory requirements
in this field would also need to take account of
the interests of the respective national
authorities in the operation of their national
markets, which may, in some areas, justify a
derogation from the concept of “home control.”
Given these challenges, the development of
such a harmonised regime would require a high
degree of dialogue and consultation among the
EU institutions, the competent national
authorities and the industry regarding the
appropriate evolution of the governance and
regulation of post-trade processing services
within the Community.
Another approach to developing a harmonised
corporate governance regime could be to use the
two existing business entities – the European
Company Statute and the European Economic
Interest Grouping (EEIG) – that have been
created at the European level to facilitate cross-
border activities. The advantage of these forms
is that they are subject to a minimum of
transparent and common corporate governance
rules laid down in two European Regulations.
In that respect, public authorities should
promote the use of the European Company
Statute introduced by Council Regulation (EC)
No 2157/2001 in 2001. The European Company
Statute is a form of public limited-liability
company with a registered office in the EU. The
novelty is that the registered office may be
transferred to another Member State without
winding-up. This company form may be used,
in particular, to create a group of CCPs and/or
CSDs as a result of a merger or to form a
33 Official Journal L 166, 11.6.1998, p.45.27
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holding company. Alternatively, public
authorities could also encourage the setting-up
of a European Economic Interest Grouping
introduced by Council Regulation (EEC) No
2137/85 in 1985. This Regulation introduced a
legal entity designed to facilitate cooperation
among business enterprises in various Member
States. The difference from the European
Company Statute is that the EEIG may only
promote the business activity of the members
but may not be formed for the purpose of
making profits for itself, as it is subject to
certain restrictions, the most important ones
being that it cannot hold shares nor exercise
management or supervision over its members.
This business form could be used to carry out
activities ancillary to those of its members, such
as part of clearing, settlement and other post-
trading services in a group composed of
member CSDs and CCPs.28
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5 CONCLUSIONS
In the context of securities clearing and
settlement systems, the nature of governance
arrangements acquires a dimension that goes
beyond their traditional function in corporate
law. They constitute a tool for regulators and
central banks to achieve their respective policy
goals relating to market operation, market
integrity and systemic stability.
In the light of the foregoing analysis, and
pending a further evolution in the regulation of
securities clearing and settlement in the
Community, the following conclusions can be
drawn.
Whatever the model of corporate governance
used in a jurisdiction, securities clearing and
settlement systems should adopt and ensure
effective implementation of high corporate
governance standards or best practices
adopted by or recommended for companies in
the jurisdiction in which they operate, as such
standards or practices evolve over time.
Generally, this would imply that securities
clearing and settlement systems at a minimum
should adopt and implement the best practices
recommended for listed companies.
Additionally, a securities clearing or settlement
system should adopt corporate  governance
mechanisms adequate to address the interests
of customers and the public authorities in the
operation of the system. Such mechanisms may
include traditional mechanisms of corporate
governance in the jurisdiction, e.g. the
appointment of independent board members and
the use of specialised board committees, such as
an audit committee, or may be mechanisms that
have developed specifically in the context of
securities settlement systems, e.g. the use of
board advisory committees or public
consultation documents. Such mechanisms
should be organised so that the criteria followed
to select members of the board or participants in
specialised committees are established ex ante.
Board members should also take into account
the interests of customers and the public
authorities in board decisions, in particular
those relating to system access criteria, fair
pricing, the adequacy of service levels, the
integrity of the risk management system, the
need for innovation and efficiency, and the
achievement of the policy objectives of
competent authorities.
Securities clearing and settlement systems
should make adequate disclosures regarding
their corporate governance arrangements so that
customers and the public authorities can
ascertain the manner in which conflicts of
interest among owners, the board, customers
and the public authorities are prevented,
resolved or mitigated. Securities clearing or
settlement systems operated by an entity held
within a financial group should disclose the
governance arrangements in place at the level of
the system operator as well as any relationships
within the financial group that bear on the
financial condition of the system operator or on
the ability of the system operator to fulfil its
functions in the markets which it serves.
Disclosure should also include detailed
information on the selection, composition, rules
and procedures of advisory bodies and their
impact on management decisions. Furthermore,
public authorities should consider the
implications of the formation of these financial
groups within the clearing and settlement
infrastructure and the adequacy of their
governance arrangements.
Corporate governance arrangements of
securities clearing and settlement systems
should be subject to adequate regulation and
oversight. In this respect, the company statutes,
the by-laws, the professional qualifications of
members of the boards of directors of system
operators, shareholdings and changes in
shareholdings, the rules of the system, the
general system of internal controls, and the risk
management programme of the system should
be subject to review or oversight by a competent
authority. Regulation, oversight, competition
law and governance arrangements should
ensure that services are provided to customers
under fair and equitable conditions of access;
that the risk management programmes of system
operators are effective; that risk management
decisions are not affected by considerations29
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5 CONCLUSIONS
extraneous to the risk management function;
and that, to the maximum extent possible,
functional service providers compete in
equivalent conditions of competition.
Looking forward, the adoption of a harmonised
regulatory regime for securities clearing and
settlement systems should be considered to
complete the internal market within the
Community and to better achieve the policy
goals identified in this paper relating to the
governance of those systems.30
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ANNEX I STANDARDS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING
TO  THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF PAYMENT
AND SECURITIES SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS
I.1 CPSS CORE PRINCIPLES FOR PAYMENT
SYSTEMS, JANUARY 2001
Core Principle X acknowledges the importance
of effective, accountable and transparent
governance for all central bank-owned,
privately-owned and jointly-owned payment
systems owing to the interdependence among
participants that those systems create. Each of
these types of systems requires a different type
of governance. Sound governance bears on all
other recommendations of the report because it
should ensure their implementation. For both to
operate effectively, payment systems and
securities settlement systems that use each
other’s services or that are operationally linked
must be governed effectively and in a manner
that permits an effective operation of the linked
systems as a whole. Good governance of linked
payment and securities settlement systems
works to ensure that standards applicable to
each of them can be implemented in a manner
that permits the systems to meet the needs of the
community they serve.
The CPSS Core Principles identify written
objectives, reporting lines, clear lines of
responsibility, qualified management entrusted
with supervision of operations, risk
management and audit functions as the tools of
a sound governance system. Sound governance
presupposes that appropriate resources have
been devoted to these functions. Accountability
is achieved through management’s obligation to
justify major decisions and actions to other
parties. The Core Principles identify
representation of owners on the governing body
of the system and consultation as tools to
address the concerns of non-shareholder
stakeholders. However, these two mechanisms
are not intended to be mutually exclusive.
Transparency is achieved through the public
disclosure of certain types of information
regarding management, organisational and
governance structure, and risk management and
control systems.
Central banks should make transparent to
customers and the public when they are acting
as owners, as a user, and as an overseer relating
to the operation of a payment system. They
should take into account the needs of the
customers in their decision-making processes
through informal dialogue or consultations with
customers.
Privately owned systems are generally owned
by their customers, which are usually banks,
and are generally organised as a cooperative.
Since the board of directors of the cooperative
is appointed by the owners, and often are
employees of owner banks, board members of
privately owned payment systems may face
conflicts of interest in properly monitoring the
system and may have a bias towards the
institution that appointed them. Board members
should resolve such conflicts of interest by
giving precedence to the needs of all customers,
not just their employers.
Jointly owned systems must have corporate
governance mechanisms that address the
concerns identified for both central bank-owned
systems and privately owned systems identified
previously.
I.2 CPSS-IOSCO RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SSSS,
NOVEMBER 2001
CPSS/IOSCO Recommendation 13 defines
corporate governance as arrangements that
“encompass the relationships between
management and owners and other interested
parties, including customers and the authorities
representing the public interest.” It requires that
governance arrangements for both central
securities depositories and central
counterparties fulfil public interest
requirements in addition to promoting the
objectives of owners and customers. This
recommendation acknowledges that no single
set of corporate governance arrangements is
appropriate for all securities settlement
systems, but identifies as key components of a
corporate governance structure: the ownership
structure, the composition of the board, the
reporting lines between management and the31
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board, and the processes that make management
accountable for its performance.
Recommendation 14 on access also relates to
governance. It requires that participants be
given access to a system according to objective
and publicly disclosed criteria relating to
technical, business and risk management
expertise; the legal powers; and the financial
resources of the applicant seeking access to the
system. Recommendation 17 also addresses
transparency requirements and
Recommendation 18 addresses the need for
appropriate regulation and oversight.
I.3 ESCB-CESR STANDARD ON GOVERNANCE,
2004
The ESCB-CESR Standards focus on the clarity
of rules, laws and procedures applicable to
securities settlement systems. The Standards
are addressed primarily to securities settlement
system operators, but also to entities offering
similar services, such as custodians with a
dominant position in a particular market. This
approach is consistent with the European
Union’s functional approach to the regulation
of financial services.
ESCB-CESR Standard 13 on governance
reflects and is consistent with the CPSS/IOSCO
Recommendation on governance, but adds
enhanced and more specific requirements
relating to governance. The ESCB-CESR
Standard specifically gives system operators an
implicit duty to take into account relevant public
policy objectives in the present European
context and to ensure the safety and efficiency
of European securities markets. It also
concludes that the management of system
operators should be subject to fitness and
properness requirements consistent with other
regulated financial firms within Europe. In
addition, it emphasises the need for some form
of user input into the decision-making process
of the system, such as a formal consultation
process with customers. Lastly, it requires that
predefined procedures for identifying and
managing potential conflicts of interest be
incorporated into system governance
arrangements.
I.4 CPSS-IOSCO RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
CENTRAL COUNTERPARTIES, MARCH 2004
CPSS-IOSCO released for public consultation
its report on “Recommendations for Central
Counterparties” in March 2004.
Recommendation 12 addresses governance of
central counterparties stating that: “Governance
arrangements for a CCP should be effective,
clear and transparent to fulfil public interest
requirements and to support the objectives of
owners and customers. In particular, they
should promote the effectiveness of the CCP’s
risk management procedures.”
In its discussion of this Recommendation,
CPSS-IOSCO focuses on the public interest in
the governance of CCPs, noting that “because
their activities are subject to significant
economies of scale, many are sole providers of
services to the market they serve. Therefore,
their performance is a critical determinant of the
safety and efficiency of those markets, which is
a matter of public interest.” Rather than
expressing a preference for a particular set of
governance arrangements, CPSS-IOSCO
focuses on the objectives that should be
achieved or accomplished through governance
arrangements. A clear emphasis is placed on the
need for transparency relating to the governance
arrangements and on the accountability of the
board of directors and senior managers. A
special emphasis is placed on governance
arrangements relating to the management of the
risks undertaken by the CCP, as appropriate
risk management mechanisms are critical to the
prevention of systemic risk. Governance
arrangements relating to risk management are
particularly important because the interests of a
CCP, participants, exchanges and trading
platform providers, owners and the public
related to risk management are different and
may be conflicting. Appropriate governance
arrangements for CCPs must therefore include
clear mechanisms to balance the interests and32
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possible conflicts of the relevant parties
involved in risk management and default
procedures.
I.5 G30 GLOBAL CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT,
A PLAN OF ACTION, JANUARY 2003
The Group of Thirty, a private body that brings
together representatives of both private sector
and public sector bodies, recently adopted an
action plan for the development of the global
securities settlement infrastructure. The G30’s
action plan is based on, and builds upon, the
CPSS/IOSCO Recommendations. While the
CPSS/IOSCO Recommendations represent an
international standard that all jurisdictions of
the world should immediately take steps to
implement, the G30’s action plan lays out a plan
for the development of the securities settlement
infrastructure in more developed jurisdictions
over a period of five years. The following four
recommendations of the G30 may be compared
with the CPSS/IOSCO Recommendation which
inspired their adoption:
– Recommendation 17 imposes a duty of care
on each board member of a securities
settlement system, and on the organisations
appointing them, to balance the conflicting
interests of all stakeholders in the operation
of the system.
– Recommendation 18 calls for the granting of
fair and non-discriminatory access to
securities settlement systems to qualified
customers and for the removal of existing
barriers, including legal and regulatory
barriers, which do not serve to mitigate
risks, enhance systemic safety or meet public
policy objectives. It also calls for boards of
directors and public authorities to put in
place procedures and programmes to
evaluate on an ongoing basis the safety of
securities settlement systems and the risks
arising from their operation.
– Recommendation 19 urges securities
settlement systems to adopt by-laws that
organise appropriate board representation of
different stakeholder interests. The report
states a preference that customers’ interests,
notwithstanding their disparity, also be taken
into account in the governance arrangements
of both user-owned and non-user-owned
systems.
· Recommendation 20 recommends that
consistent and transparent regulation and
oversight of securities settlement systems be
instituted internationally regarding the
operation of cross-border systems. This
Recommendation calls for a harmonisation
of oversight and supervision standards in
developed countries, beyond the CPSS-
IOSCO Recommendations, based on the
functions performed by a service provider
and not the legal form of the service provider
in order to create equivalent conditions of
competition. As noted previously, this
Recommendation is related to governance in
that regulation creates the framework within
which corporate governance arrangements
are organised.
I.6 CROSS-BORDER CLEARING AND
SETTLEMENT IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
(THE GIOVANNINI REPORTS), 2001 AND
2003
The “Report on cross-border clearing and
settlement arrangements in the European
Union” (November 2001; the first Giovannini
Report) noted that each of the 19 CSDs and two
ICSDs in Europe have varying governance
arrangements. While the first Giovannini
Report did not devote a specific chapter to
governance, the report included governance as
one of the areas in which the efficacy of
proposals for the development of the European
securities infrastructure should be assessed. In
the Giovannini Group’s public consultation
questionnaire, governance issues feature
prominently as an area in which public policy
objectives should be developed on a priority
basis. The questionnaire also raised the issue
whether governance arrangements should differ33
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for profit and non-profit organisations and for
user-owned and non-user-owned systems.
The “Second Report on cross-border clearing
and settlement arrangements in the European
Union” (April 2003; second Giovannini
Report) made reference to governance as a
mechanism to ensure an appropriate level of
innovation. The report identified that
appropriate governance ensures that
management and owners take into account the
needs of the customers of the system.
Governance arrangements are less crucial where
there is competition among service providers;
where there is competition in the provision of
services, customers have a variety of choices,
and system operators have strong incentives to
meet the needs of their existing and potential
customers.
In the absence of competition, adequate
governance arrangements become even more
significant in providing safeguards that the
interests of all customers are properly
addressed or taken into account by CSDs and
CCPs. The report also underscores that, in a
consolidation of CSDs or CCPs, great emphasis
should be placed on the adequacy of the
governance arrangements of the consolidated
entity. If governance arrangements are not
sufficient to remedy the disadvantages arising
from the consolidation or from the lack of
competition in the market-place, consideration
should be given to separating those functions
where competition is not important (such as
depository functionalities) from functions for
which competition is beneficial (such as
settlement functionalities). The report stresses
further the role of appropriate governance
arrangements where the same intermediaries are
both customers and owners of non-profit CSDs
and CCPs. The report suggests assessing
existing systems against standards, starting
with the CPSS/IOSCO Recommendations.
As a general remark, respondents to the public
consultation launched by the Giovannini Group
did not enumerate governance arrangements
among the fifteen barriers to efficient clearing
and settlement arrangements in the EU. The
second Giovannini Report in 2003, however,
reiterated the conclusions of the first
Giovannini Report that governance issues
feature prominently as an area in which public
policy objectives should be developed on a
priority basis.
I.7 COMMISSION COMMUNICATION ON
CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT, 2002 AND
2004
The Commission, in its 2002 Communication
on Clearing and Settlement issued following the
publication of the first Giovanni Report, also
focused on the removal of distortions of and
restraints on competition in the clearing and
settlement infrastructure and announced that it
was conducting an in-depth inquiry into the
observance of competition policy by clearing
and settlement service providers.
The 2004 Communication on Clearing and
Settlement (COM (2004) 312 final) following
the publication of the second Giovannini Report
focused on appropriate governance measures
without a preference for a particular model. The
Commission has envisaged laying down high-
level principles in a framework Directive
specifying that transparent governance
arrangements is a major objective for securities
settlement systems, central counterparties, as
well as intermediaries offering settlement
services. In order to address competition
concerns, the Commission has envisaged
imposing a separation of settlement services
from ancillary banking and other non-core
services in terms of accounting and pricing.
Since July 2004, the Commission has chaired an
Advisory and Monitoring Group on EU
Clearing and Settlement, called CESAME, that
will form an interface between the private and
public sectors, advise the Commission on
technical issues and liaise with experts and
think-tanks.34
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I.8 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT REPORT ON
CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT, 2002
Following the first Giovannini Report, in 2002
the EU Parliament published a “Report on
Clearing and Settlement”, which concluded that
effective corporate governance mechanisms are
possible policy tools to address issues
emanating from particular corporate structures
and to enhance the stability of financial
markets.35
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 ANNEX 2 ANNEX II EUROPEAN CSDS AND CCPS
II.1 Organisational information on CSDs in the European Union
Member State CSD Corporate form Ownership structure
Austria OeKB AG Bank User-owned, with the majority being owned by leading
Austrian banks
Belgium Euroclear Bank Bank User-owned group. Euroclear Group. Euroclear plc owned by
International CSD Euronext, the former shareholders of Sicovam and CrestCo,
and third parties. Euroclear Bank owned by its users.
Euronext – CIK Commercial entity Exchange-owned, by Euronext Brussels. Euronext Group is a
public company whose shareholders include the former
shareholders of the Paris, Brussels, Porto and Amsterdam
Exchanges and institutional and retail investors. In February
2004, Euroclear Bank acquired the book-entry settlement
system of CIK
Cyprus CDCR Division of the Cyprus Exchange-owned, by Cyprus Stock Exchange, which is a
Stock Exchange public limited company
Czech Republic UNIVYC/ Public limited company 100% ownership by the leading Czech IT firm that carried
Securities Centre out the voucher privatisation
RM-SYSTEM/ Public limited company Exchange-owned (Prague Stock Exchange)
Securities Centre
SKD Not a distinct legal entity NCB-owned (Česká národní banka)
Denmark VP A/S Non-profit commercial User-owned. Owners comprise banks, stockbroking
entity companies, bond-issuing companies, Danmarks Nationalbank,
share issuers and institutional investors
Estonia ECSD Public limited company Exchange-owned (Tallinn Stock Exchange, owned by the
HEX Group)
Finland1 APK Commercial entity Group-owned. OM Hex Group, public company.2 Since 31
December 2003, OM HEX Group has been owned by:
Investor AB (11.3%); Swedish state (6.9%); Nordea (5.7%);
Robur Funds (5.5%); Fidelity Funds (5.2%); AMF Pension
(3.8%); Förenings Sparbanken (3.2%); Didner & Gerge
aktiefond (3.0%); SEB Funds (2.7%); Alecta (2.6%); Olof
Stenhammar & companies (2.6%); other Swedish owners
(25.8%); other non-Swedish owners (21.7%)
France Euroclear France Commercial entity Part of the Euroclear Group (see Belgium)
Germany Clearstream Bank Group-owned by the Deutsche Börse Group, public company.
Banking Frankfurt At the time of the initial listing of the parent company,
several German banks held significant stakes, with the
balance floated to the public
Greece3 Central Securities Commercial entity Majority owned by exchanges and their related financial
Depositary S.A. groups, including: Athens Exchange S.A.; Hellenic
Exchanges S.A.; banks listed on the ATHEX; portfolio
management companies; mutual funds; and brokerage firms
Hungary KELER Public limited company Owned by the Hungarian NCB (50%), Budapest Stock
Exchange (25%) and Budapest Commodities Exchange (25%)
Italy Monte Titoli spa Commercial entity Exchange-owned group, owned by the Gruppo Borsa Italiana,
itself owned by the principal Italian banks as well as
domestic and international institutional investors
1) APK also operates the CSDs in Estonia and Latvia.
2) The HEX Group merged with OM AB of Sweden in September 2003.
3) There are other systems that are not covered in this table.36
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Member State CSD Corporate form Ownership structure
Ireland4 CRESTCo/ Commercial entity/bank Part of the Euroclear Group. The group is user-owned
Euroclear Bank (see Belgium)
Latvia VNS Not a distinct legal entity NCB-owned (Latvijas Banka)
LCD-DENOS Public limited company Exchange-owned (Riga Stock Exchange, which is now owned
by the HEX Group)
Lithuania CSDL Public company Owned by Lietuvos bankas (majority shareholder), the
Ministry of Finance and the National Stock Exchange of
Lithuania
Luxembourg Clearstream Bank Group-owned by the Deutsche Börse Group, public company.
Banking Luxembourg At the time of the initial listing of the parent company,
several German banks held significant stakes, with the
balance floated to the public
Malta CSD Division of the Malta Exchange-owned (Malta Stock Exchange, which is
Stock Exchange government-owned)
Netherlands Euroclear NL Commercial entity Part of the Euroclear Group (see Belgium)
Poland KDPW Public limited company Owned in equal parts by the State Treasury, Warsaw Stock
Exchange and Narodowy Bank Polski
CRBS-SKARBNET Not a distinct legal entity NCB-owned (Narodowy Bank Polski)
Portugal Interbolsa Commercial entity Exchange-owed within the Euronext Group (see Belgium)
Slovakia NBS-CR Not a distinct legal entity NCB-owned (Národná banka Slovenska)
SC State-owned joint Established by the Ministry of Finance as a joint stock
stock company company with a 100% share of the state
BSSE Division of Bratislava Exchange-owned (Bratislava Stock Exchange, a public
Stock Exchange limited company, with private banks as main shareholders)
Slovenia KDD Public limited company User-owned (KDD members: credit institutions and securities
intermediaries; Banka Slovenije also a minor shareholder)
FEBSS Not a distinct legal entity NCB-owned (Banka Slovenije)
Spain IBERCLEAR Commercial entity Group-owned by Bolsas y Mercados Espańoles (BME), owned
by the former shareholders of the operating companies of the
exchanges of Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia and Bilbao, MEFF
Holdings (derivatives), AIAF (corporate bonds), Senaf
(government bonds), Iberclear, and the citrus exchange
Sweden VPC Commercial entity VPC is owned 98.6% by the four Nordic banks: Förenings
Sparbanken, Nordea Bank Sweden, SEB and Svenska
Handelsbanken. 1.4% owned by other securities companies
United Kingdom CRESTCo Commercial entity Part of the Euroclear Group. The group is user-owned
(see Belgium)
II.1 Organisational information on CSDs in the European Union (cont’)
4) For securities issued by Irish entities. There is also the NTMA for the settlement of short-term public debt.37
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Member State CCP Corporate form Ownership structure products cleared
Austria Wiener Börse Commercial entity Austrian banks and other users Derivatives
Belgium LCH.Clearnet S.A., Bank LCH.Clearnet Group Limited is Equities and bonds; interest
a subsidiary of owned: 45.1% by exchanges; 45.1% rate & commodity futures
LCH.Clearnet by former members of LCH; and 9.8% and options; equity & index
Group Limited by Euroclear. Of the 45.1% owned by futures & options; OTC-
exchanges, Euronext owns 41.5%, but traded bonds and repos
its voting rights are limited to 24.9%
Denmark FUTOP Clearing, Commercial entity User-owned, principally by leading Derivatives
a division of Danish banks: Danske Bank AS;
Copenhagen Stock Nordea AB; Nykredit AS; Sydbank A/S.
Exchange No other shareholder owns over 5%
Finland Helsinki Exchanges Commercial entity Group-owned by the OM HEX Group Derivatives
(see under APK in the previous table)




Germany EUREX Commercial entity Public company, owned in equal Equities, derivatives,
Clearing AG parts by Deutsche Börse AG and repos and bonds
the Swiss Exchange
Clearing Bank Commercial entity Three German banks and one Agricultural and energy
Hanover Norwegian bank products
Greece ADECH Commercial entity Athens Securities Exchange, Derivatives and repos
Athens Derivatives Exchange and
institutional investors
Hungary KELER Public limited Owned by Magyar Nemzeti Bank Derivatives and cash
company (50%), Budapest Stock Exchange instruments
(25%) and the Budapest Commodities
Exchange (25%)
Italy Cassa di Commercial entity Since 1999 the Italian Stock Exchange Exchange-traded
Compensazione (72.73%), the remaining 27.27% derivatives and equities
e Garanzia (CC&G) being held by five banks since 2003




Poland KDPW Public limited Owned in equal parts by the State Derivatives, treasury
company Treasury, Warsaw Stock Exchange bonds , equities, and
and Narodowy Bank Polski other securities
Portugal Euronext Lisbon Commercial entity, Euronext NV, a public company Derivatives
division of
Euronext Lisbon
Spain MEFF Commercial entity, Group-owned by Bolsas y Mercados Derivatives
division of MEFF Espańoles (BME) (see Iberclear in
Exchange the previous table)
Sweden Stockholmsbörsen Commercial entity Group-owned by OM HEX Derivatives
AB, division of Group (see Finland)
OM AB
United Kingdom LCH.Clearnet Ltd, Commercial entity See Belgium Equities, derivatives, repos
a subsidiary of and swaps
LCH.Clearnet
Group Limited
II.2 Organisational information on CCPs in the European Union38
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